Published at : 27 Dec 2022
Volume : IJtech
Vol 13, No 7 (2022)
DOI : https://doi.org/10.14716/ijtech.v13i7.6194
Sergey Grishunin | National Research University, Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, 101000, Russia |
Eugenia Naumova | National Research University, Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Ulitsa, Moscow, 101000, Russia |
Ekaterina Burova | Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, 29 Politechnicheskaya Ulitsa, St. Petersburg, 195251, Russia |
Svetlana Suloeva | Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, 29 Politechnicheskaya Ulitsa, St. Petersburg, 195251, Russia |
Tatyana Nekrasova | Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, 29 Politechnicheskaya Ulitsa, St. Petersburg, 195251, Russia |
Sustainable growth is
the key global priority, and environmental, social and governance (ESG)
objectives have become the main point of attention in companies’ digital
transformation strategies. ESG and digital transformation reinforce each other
as they aim to improve efficiency and meet stakeholders inside and outside the
company. This is true for telecommunication companies, where disruptive
technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data or cloud computing are
reshaping the industry. Assessment of the impact of sustainability disclosures
on companies’ value is a task of high interest for academics and practitioners
from telecommunication companies. ESG disclosure serves as a key channel to
inform investors about the efficiency of ESG risk management and control
practices of the firm and thus can impact the firm’s financial performance and
market value. However, there are numerous controversies in the academic
literature on this topic and a lack of research specifically for the
telecommunication industry. We closed the research gaps and investigated the
impact of ESG disclosure on Tobin-Q of 93 US-listed telecommunication service
companies between 2011-2021. We found that aggregated ESG disclosure score
positively impacted telecoms’ Tobin-Q. Among individual ESG disclosure pillars,
only corporate governance positively influenced Tobin-Q, while the impact of
environmental and social pillars was statistically insignificant. We also found that CEO duality significantly
and negatively impacted Tobin-Q. The presence of the corporate social responsibility
(CSR) committee, greater gender diversity and a higher percentage of
independent directors on the board positively affected the value of the
telecoms. The result of the study can be applied in developing ESG rating
methodologies for telecommunication companies. They can also assist telecom
companies’ managers and stakeholders to identify key value drivers of the ESG
agenda.
Corporate governance; ESG disclosure; ICT; Sustainable development; Tobin Q
In the
last decade, the global telecommunication industry has changed significantly
and enabled a lot of digital innovations. These changes have been driven by the
rapid dissemination of high-speed internet, mobile devices, big data, cloud
technologies, over-the-top media services or 5G generation mobile networks (Santoso et al., 2019). The industry has
reformatted into the info-communication space (ICT), where telecommunication
and IT are intertwined to provide customers with a large variety of services: from “traditional” voice and data
transmission to different kinds of digital services and users
applications.
These new opportunities
come with challenges which mute the market value of companies in the industry (Mohammad &
Wasiuzzaman, 2021). One of these challenges
is the dissemination of environmental, social and governance (ESG) investing.
Investors are ready to provide long-term funding only to those companies that
follow the principles of sustainable development. Moreover, studies showed that
the successful integration of sustainable practices could affect the firms’
value (Schramade, 2016). The GSMA, the
mobile operators’ industry association, conducted research which showed that
ESG reduced companies’ capital cost and positively influenced stock prices
(GCMA, 2020).
ICTs communicate with
stakeholders on ESG issues via ESG disclosure. The latter reduces the
informational asymmetry between stakeholders and the management; improves
the firm’s reputation and demonstrates commitment to sustainability (Porter et al.,
2019). Ultimately, the quality
of ESG disclosure affects the market value of the firm. (Fatemi et al., 2017; Friede et
al., 2020). However, there are numerous controversies in the literature.
There is evidence that ESG disclosure had a neutral or even negative impact on
a company’s cost of capital or performance (Dhaliwal et. al., 2011; Atan et al., 2018; Buallay et al., 2020). There is a lack of research on this topic in the ICT
industry.
2. Literature review
2.1. Importance of ESG agenda and practices in info-communication industry
ESG is an important measure of sustainable corporate development and an extension of the socially responsible investment concept (Rodionov, et al., 2018; Koroleva et al., 2020; Nekhili et al., 2021; Khorin & Krikunov, 2021). Companies in the ICT industry can impact global sustainability via complex, indirect effects on energy consumption, data privacy and security as well governance and transparency (Berawi, 2020). The carbon emissions in ICT come mainly from power consumption and bandwidth usage and currently exceed 0.8 gigatons. In 2021 the industry used approximately 4% of total global power demand. This share can increase to 10% by 2025. The shift toward green info-communication is now observed by adopting energy-efficient and renewable energy technologies (Mohanty & Moreira, 2014). Social factors which should be of concern in ICT firms are workplace conditions, diversity, employee engagement and belongingness. This is due to harmful stereotypes and a lack of digital confidence on the part of women. Others issues such as human rights violations at ICT companies’ vendors or leakages of private data of consumers. ICT firms following the best ESG practices demonstrated better financial performance (Sutherland, 2016). Corporate governance is the most influential factor for ICTs; its impact on the firms’ performance can reach around 60% (Rittenhouse et al., 2011).
2.2. Review of academic and practical literature
a) Impact of ESG pillars on firms’ value
The outcome of studies which have tested the impact of the
following ESG agenda on the value of the firms is controversial. Some argue
that the firms which follow good ESG practices improve their non-financial
indicators such as consumer and supplier satisfaction, market acceptance,
employees’ management skills etc. (Atan et al., 2018; Mohammad & Wasiuzzaman, 2021). As for G-component, many studies showed that good
governance increased investors’ confidence. This positively affects the firm’s
value (Siagian et al., 2013;
Miroshnychenko et al., 2017). In some
cases, E-pillar harmed the firm’s value, indicating that ESG activities’
payoffs did not exceed their costs (Verbeeten et
al., 2016). Several industrial studies have found either a negative or a
nonsignificant association between ESG performance and firm value or
performance (Fisher-Vanden & Thorburn, 2008; Horváthová, 2010). The results significantly varied among
industries.
b) The relationship between ESG disclosure and firms’ value
and performance
Many papers stated that companies engaged in high-quality
ESG disclosures were associated with lower systematic and idiosyncratic risks.
That should result in higher market value. This effect is the most pronounced
for the listed firms in developed markets (Porter et al., 2019). Firstly, a firm’s ESG disclosure is a predictor of its
ESG score: firms with positive ESG performance would report their ratings
fully, and those with negative ESG performance would choose to report
minimally. ESG disclosure is associated with a competitive advantage, a
society-oriented product offering and a high reputation (Cho & Patten,
2007). However, there are
controversies in research. Cai and He (Cai & He, 2014) found a positive correlation between following ESG
practices and companies' values using 20 years of data from 1992 to 2011 (Cai &
He, 2014). Dhaliwal et al. examined
the relationship between ESG disclosure and the equity cost of capital in an
international sample of 31 countries. They found a negative association between
ESG disclosure and the cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal
et al., 2014). Plumee et al., found no significant association between
the overall level of voluntary ESG disclosure and the value of the firm, its
component cash flows, or its cost of capital (Plumlee et al.,
2015). Fatemi (Fatemi, 2018) showed that ESG disclosure, per se,
decreases firms' valuation.
2.3. Conclusion from the literature review
There is no generally accepted framework which explains the
contradictions in the literature. The gaps are the lack of research which
explored different patterns of ESG practices and disclosure in various
industries and how they impacted firms’ performance. Some papers used short
datasets. Conversely, the research indicated a U-shaped relationship between
the impact of ESG practices and value (Trumpp & Günther, 2017). This confirms that investments made in ESG bring results
only in the future.
3.1. Development of the research hypotheses
Due
to the conflicting results found in the literature, the hypotheses are as
follows:
H1:
In the telecommunication sector, firm value is positively associated with ESG
disclosure
H2:
In the telecommunication sector, the value of the company is positively
associated with E-component disclosure
H3:
In the telecommunication sector, the value of the company is positively
associated with S-component disclosure
H4:
In the telecommunication sector, the value of the company is positively
associated with G-component disclosure
H5:
Selected components of E, S or G components of disclosures have a significant
impact on the financial performance of telecommunication companies
3.2. The data
We used the annual panel data for telecoms listed on the USA stock
exchanges between 2011-2021. The period covers almost the entire history of the
development of ESG financing and the availability of ESG disclosure ratings (Ivashkovskaya & Mikhailova, 2020). We chose the US financial
market due to its high liquidity and long history of listing of telecoms. The
screening of the companies was performed on Capital IQ. We applied the
following selection criteria: the firm’s earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are greater than 0; and the total
enterprise value (TEV) is greater than 0. The screening resulted in a dataset
of 306 companies, from which the top 100 were chosen by their market value. We
used Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores (the ESG score and E, S and G components
scores) as a proxy for the quality of ESG disclosure. It tracks about 800
different disclosure metrics that cover all aspects of ESG, from emissions to
shareholder rights. The companies in the ranking are ranked from 0 to 100, with
100 being the best score. We normalized the Blomberg ESG disclosure score to
[0;1].
The dependent variable is the Tobin Q metric (TQ) which represents the sum
of market capitalization, total liabilities, preferred equity and minority
interest divided by total assets. It is a good proxy for the firm value and
allows investors to assess the justification of an investment in a firm: if its
market value is higher than the accounting value (that is, q-Tobin > 1),
then the investment is justified and vice versa (in the case when q-Tobin <
1). Tobin Q is a good indicator of investors’ expectations. This metric is the
most widespread in studies of the impact of sustainable practices on financial
results (Nirino et al., 2021). The set of
independent variables consists of complex ESG scores, individual E, S and G
scores and control variables: (1) debt ratio; (2) tangibility; and (3) return
on assets (ROA) (Table 1). ROA was chosen as it is an indicator to assess the
quality of the company's management, namely the efficiency of the use of
capital. The tangibility ratio measures the importance of non-financial capital
in creating value and indicates a firm’s internal competitive advantage.
Telecoms with a smaller proportion of tangible assets grow faster (Lei et al., 2018). The debt ratio measures financial leverage. The
studies showed that leverage is positively related to a firm’s value as the
returns earned
Table 1 Dependent
variables and their descriptive statistics.
Calculation |
Notation |
Expected sign |
Mean |
Standard deviation |
Minimum |
Maximum | |
ESG score |
Bloomberg |
ESGit |
“+” |
0.882 |
0.323 |
0 |
0.96 |
E score |
Bloomberg |
Eit |
“+” |
0.748 |
0.435 |
0 |
0.92 |
S score |
Bloomberg |
Sit |
“+” |
0.806 |
0.396 |
0 |
0.93 |
G score |
Bloomberg |
Git |
“+” |
0.882 |
0.323 |
0 |
0.97 |
ROA |
Net income/Average assets |
ROAit |
“+” |
0.061 |
0.179 |
-0.32 |
5.320 |
Tangibility ratio |
Net fixed
assets/Total assets |
TANGit |
“-“ |
0.790 |
0.092 |
0.220 |
0.990 |
Leverage |
Debt/Equity |
DEBTit |
“+” |
0.395 |
0.403 |
0 |
9.860 |
Source: calculated by authors
For all our analyses, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is below 10, signifying no sign of multicollinearity and the correlation between the dependent variables is below 0.4.
3.3. The model
The regression
model to test the H1 is as follows:
The regression model to test H2-H4 is as follows:
To regression model to test H5 is as follows:
where: fit – factors describing some
individual components of ESG disclosure score (see Results section); K – the
number of explanatory variables. For our panel data, we used three methods
based on which it is possible to estimate the relationship between Tobin Q and
dependent variables: pooled OLS regression, fixed effect (FE) linear model and
random effect (RE) linear model. To select the best model between fixed and random effect specifications, we used Durbin–Wu–Hausman
test.
Table 2 shows the
results of the estimation of regressions (1) and (2). The constant is not
significant for all specifications, and thus, it is not shown in the table. The
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test and c Breusch-Pagan
LM test confirm that the fixed effect (FE) estimator is the most efficient.
Thus, the study focuses on the FE estimators to explain the results. According to the F-statistic value, all
models have the predictive capability: p-values are lower than 1%, meaning that
the null hypothesis of all regression coefficients being equal to zero is
rejected.
Table 2 shows that the ESG disclosure score is significant at 10% confidence level. A positive sign means that ESG disclosure increases the market value of telecommunication firm. Thus, the hypothesis H1 is confirmed. On the one hand, this conclusion agrees with those of (Servaes & Tamayo, 2012) but on the other hand, this outcome contradicts the finding of (Buallay & Marri, 2022; Velte, 2017) who found a negative relationship between Tobin Q and sustainability disclosure. We explain this by the differences in explored markets, sample size and timespan. Additional further research is necessary to explore these contradictions.
Table 2 The results of the
estimation of regressions (1) and (2)
Variable |
Pooled OLS |
FE |
RE |
Pooled OLS |
FE |
RE |
ESG |
0.117* (0.116) |
0.149* (0.088) |
0.152* (0.089) |
|
|
|
E |
|
|
|
-0.056 (0.161) |
-0.274 (0.167) |
-0.217 (0.160) |
S |
|
|
|
0.054 (0.204) |
0.102 (0.163) |
0.089 (0.182) |
G |
|
|
|
0.169* (0.175) |
0.273** (0.136) |
0.244* (0.137) |
Debt ratio |
0.914*** (0.094) |
0.984*** (0.092) |
0.964*** (0.089) |
0.916*** (0.945) |
1.006*** (0.093) |
0.978*** (0.090) |
Tangibility |
-1.582*** (0.458) |
-2.073*** (0.549) |
-1.996*** (0.508) |
-1.567*** (0.460) |
-2.046*** (0.549) |
-1.970*** (0.508) |
ROA |
1.669*** (0.212) |
0.476*** (0.160) |
0.629*** (0.161) |
1.673*** (0.212) |
0.470*** (0.160) |
0.623*** (0.161) |
Observations |
1 034 |
1 034 |
1 034 |
1 034 |
1 034 |
1 034 |
R-squared |
0.140 |
0.306 |
0.146 |
0.140 |
0.309 |
0.148 |
p-value (F-test
robust) |
0.0023 |
0.001 |
0.036 |
0.0024 |
0.000 |
0.039. |
p-value Hausmann
test |
|
|
0.1588 |
|
|
0.1645 |
Breusch-Pagan LM
test. (F p-value_ |
0.000 |
|
|
0.0000 |
|
|
***, **, * indicate the value
is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level
Source: author’s calculation
The individual disclosure pillars: environmental (E)
and social (S) are both statistically insignificant in influencing the Tobin’s
Q. Therefore, hypotheses H2 and H3 are rejected. Conversely, governance pillar
(G) is significant at a 5% confidence level. Hence, hypothesis H4 is confirmed.
These results coincide with that of (Rittenhouse
et al., 2011), that the share of corporate performance (G-factors)
in the investors' expectations of ICT companies equalled around 60%. This is
also confirmed by practical studies, for example (Derue,
2021), which state that unlike investors in other industries with the
severe influence of environmental factors (oil and gas or metals and mining) or
social factors (e.g. banking or mining) the impact of these factors in
telecommunication sector (especially in large established corporates) is
marginal. Moreover, the insignificance of these factors may be explained by the
fact that these factors have a more significant impact on the value of the firm
in markets with weak development of financial institutions (Ge & Liu, 2015), but we studied the US market
Conversely, the governance has a first-order impact on telecommunication
companies as it increases investors’ confidence, which results in larger firm’s
value (Siagian et al., 2013). All control
variables are significant at 1%, and signs of the variables coincide with the
previous findings and our expectations. The higher the company’s profitability,
the higher its market value and the increase in the company’s leverage also
positively affect its value. Tangibility has an opposite effect, it negatively
and significantly decreases Tobin Q. This agrees with the findings of (Lei et al., 2018). These results indicate that the model is correctly
specified.
Let’s now test the H5. G-factor appeared to be the only ESG pillar influencing the Tobin-Q of telecommunication firms. For our research, we selected first-order G-impact factors (Table 3) cited in the literature (Velte, 2017; Malik & Makhdoom, 2016). To get information about individual corporate governance practices we used data from the Refinitive Thomson Reuters terminal.
Table 3 G-factors considered in the research and their descriptive statistics
Variable |
Calcu-lation |
Notation |
Expected sign |
Mean |
Standard deviation |
Minimum |
Maximum |
Independence policy |
0/1 |
IPit |
“+” |
0.522 |
0.5 |
0 |
1 |
Percentage of independent director in the board |
% |
NEDit |
“+” |
59.098 |
31.242 |
0% |
100% |
CEO Chairman Duality |
0/1 |
CDit |
“-“ |
0.524 |
0.5 |
0 |
1 |
Existence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Board committee |
0/1 |
CSRit |
“+” |
0.74 |
0.439 |
0 |
1 |
Women in board |
% |
WBit |
“+” |
11.422 |
12.072 |
0% |
100% |
`Source:
calculated by authors
For all our analysis, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is below 10, signifying
moderate multicollinearity and the correlation between the dependent variables
is below 0.2.
Among the studies that examined the impact of the mentioned individual
corporate governance factors on financial indicators, controversial estimates
were obtained. The high presence of independent directors on the board usually
positively influences Tobin-Q (Malik &
Makhdoom, 2016). Impact of Board diversity on firm value can be either positive (Smith et al., 2006) or negative (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). The empirical evidence of
the relationship between CEO duality and policy independence is also
inconclusive. For example, Harris and Helfat (Harris
& Helfat, 1998) in a literature review, showed that out of 13
studies, three indicated negative effects, while ten exhibited either positive
or absence of effects. The results of
the estimation of regression (3) are presented in the Table 4.
The
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test confirms that the fixed effect (FE) estimator is the
most efficient; thus, the study focuses on the FE estimators to explain the
results. Moreover, p-values in F-test were lower than 1%, meaning that the null
hypothesis of all regression coefficients being equal to zero is rejected.
Table 4 The results of
estimation of regressions (1) and (2) for G factor in telecoms firms
Variable |
Pooled
OLS |
FE |
RE |
Independence
policy |
-0.078 (0.059) |
-0.008 (0.023) |
0.039 (0.065) |
Percentage
of independent directors in the board |
0 (0.002) |
0.001* (0.001) |
0.002* (0.001) |
CEO
Chairman Duality |
-0.053 (0.042) |
-0.045*** (0.017) |
-0.088* (0.046) |
Existence
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Board committee |
-0.119* (0.062) |
0.04* (0.021) |
0.053 (0.048) |
Women
in board |
0.011*** (0.002) |
0.007*** (0.001) |
-0.053 (0.048) |
Constant |
0.194 (0.589) |
0.174 (0.489) |
0.201 (0.514) |
Observations |
1 034 |
1 034 |
1 034 |
R-squared |
0.121 |
0.180 |
0.115 |
p-value (F-test
robust) |
0,0000 |
0,00031 |
0,000573 |
p-value Hausmann
test |
|
|
1,0 |
Breusch-Pagan LM
test. (F statistics p-value)* |
0,00000 |
|
|
***, **, * indicate the value
is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, standard errors are stated in
parenthesis
Source: author’s calculation
Therefore,
hypothesis H5 is partially confirmed as factors of corporate governance affect
the value of telecommunication companies. CEO duality has a significant (at a
1% level) and negative impact on a company’s value. This result suggests that
if these posts are separated, the investment attractiveness of the
telecommunication company increases. This result coincides with that of (Rhoades et al., 2001). Consequently, Tobin Q for
companies in which CSR committees exist is higher than for those organizations
without a committee. Thirdly, greater gender diversity increases the market's
assessment of the company's prospects reflected in Tobin Q. This result
coincides with (Smith et al.,
2006). Lastly, the percentage of independent directors has a significant (but
only at a 10% level) but the marginal effect on Tobin Q. This finding agrees
with that having a moderate number of independent directors can increase a
firm’s value. On the contrary, firms with “supermajority-independent boards can
be less profitable than their counterparts. Moreover, independent directors can
give little value to telecommunication companies because in this industry
director’s technical expertise can be more valuable than their outsider status.
We closed the research gaps and investigated
the impact of ESG disclosure on Tobin-Q of US-listed telecommunication service
companies between 2011-2021. We showed that the ESG disclosure score positively
affects the value of the company. Among individual ESG disclosure pillars, only
corporate governance positively affects Tobin-Q and is statistically
significant (at a 5% level). Environmental and social pillars are both
statistically insignificant in influencing Tobin Q of the telecoms. We also
identified individual corporate governance factors which influence the value of
telecoms. We found that CEO duality significantly and negatively impacts a
company’s value. On the contrary, the presence of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) committee, greater gender diversity on the Board and the
percentage of independent directors on the Board positively affect the value of
the telecoms. The study’s limitations are the following: (1) it does not
address the issue of the U-shaped link between the value of the firm and ESG
disclosures; (2) the limited number of years used in modelling. These
limitations will be addressed in further studies. Also, further research
directions include exploring the impact of ESG disclosures on both companies’
performance and value in various industries in emerging markets.
The research was partially funded by the Ministry of
Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation under the strategic
academic leadership program ‘Priority 2030’ (agreement 075-15-2021-1333, dated
30 September 2021).
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